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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE: INCRETIN-BASED THERAPIES
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION

Case No.:
13md2452 AJB (MDD)

As to all related and member cases

**ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND DENYING
PLAINTIFFS’ CROSS-MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT**

(Doc. Nos. 1163, 1166)

I. INTRODUCTION

Through the enactment of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 *et seq.*, Congress delegated authority to the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to regulate pharmaceutical manufacturers and their products. With subsequent amendments, Congress enlarged this authority, charging the FDA with the power to protect the public health, and to assure the safety, effectiveness, and reliability of drugs. In discharging its regulatory duties, the FDA oversees the introduction of new drugs into the market, regulates the content of drug labeling, and ensures manufacturers comply with postmarketing requirements. Despite the FDA’s broad regulatory duties, a drug manufacturer remains primarily responsible for maintaining the adequacy of product

1 labeling. State tort law is therefore generally viewed as a complimentary form of drug
2 regulation, providing additional protections and recourse for injured consumers. Yet,
3 when state tort law imposes a duty impossible to meet in light of FDA regulations,
4 federal law will preempt state law. Impossibility preemption is a form of conflict
5 preemption and is a demanding defense—requiring a drug manufacturer to establish by
6 clear evidence that the FDA would reject a proposed labeling change.

7 Despite the high burden imposed on a preemption proponent, the unprecedented
8 facts of this case cross the clear evidence threshold, making Defendants’ preemption
9 defense not only viable, but also dispositive of Plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn claims. The
10 record establishes the FDA has specifically considered pancreatic cancer risk,
11 commented publicly on the adequacy of drug labeling, and maintained its position that
12 scientific evidence of a causal association between incretin mimetics and pancreatic
13 cancer is indeterminate. Because an indeterminate causal association falls below the
14 federal regulatory standards required for labeling changes, clear evidence exists that the
15 FDA would have rejected a reference to pancreatic cancer in product labeling. For the
16 reasons set forth below, the Court **GRANTS** Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
17 and **DENIES** Plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment on the affirmative defense
18 of conflict preemption.

19 **II. BACKGROUND**

20 This multidistrict litigation involves claims that Defendants failed to warn that four
21 prescription drugs used to treat type 2 diabetes cause or create an increased risk of
22 pancreatic cancer. Plaintiffs are individuals with type 2 diabetes who were prescribed and
23 consumed one or more of the prescription drugs marketed respectively as Januvia,
24 Janumet, Byetta, and Victoza.¹ Defendants are the pharmaceutical companies that
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26
27 ¹ The drugs are sometimes referred to by their active ingredients. Sitagliptin is the active
28 ingredient in Januvia and Janumet, exenatide is the active ingredient in Byetta, and
liraglutide is the active ingredient in Victoza.

1 manufacture and market the drugs, including Amylin Pharmaceuticals, LLC (“Amylin”),
2 Eli Lilly and Company (“Lilly”), Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. (“Merck”), and Novo
3 Nordisk Inc. (“Novo”) (referred to collectively as “Defendants”).

4 Byetta obtained FDA approval in April 2005. (Doc. Nos. 202-1 ¶ 38; 1163-2 Ex.
5 F.) The FDA approved Januvia in October 2006 and Janumet in March 2007. (Doc. Nos.
6 202-1 ¶¶ 34, 36; 1163-2 Exs. G, H.) Victoza obtained FDA approval in January 2010.
7 (Doc. Nos. 1163-1 at 8; 1163-2 Ex. I.) Byetta and Victoza are glucagon-like peptide-1
8 (GLP-1) receptor agonists, and Januvia and Janumet are dipeptidyl peptidase-4 (DPP-4)
9 inhibitors. (*Id.* ¶ 33.) Although GLP-1 receptor agonists and DPP-4 inhibitors are
10 different classes of drugs, for the purposes of this litigation the parties treat them the
11 same. (*See generally* Doc. Nos. 206, 1163, 1166.) The FDA has also reviewed both
12 classes of therapeutic agents as a whole, recognizing all four drugs under the broader
13 terms of incretin mimetics or incretin-based therapies. (*See* Doc. Nos. 202 ¶ 33; 1163-3 at
14 3; 1166-10 at 2.)

15 Plaintiffs allege Defendants should have referenced pancreatic cancer in their
16 product labeling.² Defendants assert Plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn claims are conflict
17 preempted because it would be impossible to reference pancreatic cancer in the drug
18 labeling and comply with FDA labeling regulations. Defendants initially moved for
19 summary judgment premised on conflict preemption in April 2014. (Doc. No. 410.) The
20 Court denied the motion without prejudice and granted Plaintiffs’ request for additional
21 discovery pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). (Doc. No. 472.) In June
22 2015, following discovery focused on conflict preemption, Defendants renewed their
23 motion for summary judgment, (Doc. No. 1163), and Plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for
24

25 ² Plaintiffs argue Defendants should have warned about an increased risk of pancreatic
26 cancer or listed pancreatic cancer as a possible adverse reaction associated with the use of
27 the drugs. Any mention by the Court of a pancreatic cancer “reference” in the product
28 labeling encompasses either a warning about pancreatic cancer or listing pancreatic
cancer as an adverse reaction.

1 summary judgment, (Doc. No. 1166). The Court heard oral argument on the motions on
2 September 11, 2015. (*See* Doc. No. 1445.)³

3 III. LEGAL STANDARD

4 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs motions for summary judgment.
5 Summary judgment permits a court to enter judgment on factually unsupported claims,
6 *see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 319, 327 (1986), and may also be used in the area
7 of affirmative defenses. *Dam v. Gen'l. Elec. Co.*, 265 F.2d 612, 614 (9th Cir. 1958).
8 Granting summary judgment is proper if there is “no genuine dispute as to any material
9 fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A
10 fact is material when, under the governing substantive law, it could affect the outcome of
11 the case. *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a
12 material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
13 verdict for the nonmoving party.” *Id.* Where parties file cross-motions for summary
14 judgment, a court must consider each party’s evidence, regardless of which motion offers
15 the evidence. *Tulalip Tribes of Wash. v. Washington*, 783 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir.
16 2015); *Las Vegas Sands, LLC v. Nehme*, 632 F.3d 526, 532 (9th Cir. 2011).

17 IV. DISCUSSION

18 Under the Supremacy Clause, “Congress has the power to preempt state law.”
19 *Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council*, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000); *see also Oneok, Inc. v.*
20 *Learjet, Inc.*, 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1594–95 (2015). A preemption analysis begins with two

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22 ³ Pursuant to the agreement of all parties, the Court held joint oral argument with the
23 pancreatic cancer cases pending in the Los Angeles County Superior Court (Case No.
24 JCCP 4272), in an effort to promote the convenient and efficient resolution of nearly
25 identical preemption-based motions for summary judgment pending in the state and
26 federal proceedings. *See In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liab. Litig.*, 460
27 F.3d 1217, 1222 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting a court’s statutory charge in a multidistrict
28 litigation proceeding is to promote the just and efficient conduct of the actions pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1407). While the hearing was held jointly, the Court has deliberated
individually without any discussion of the merits of the parties’ claims, including the
applicable law or the facts, with the judge presiding over the JCCP proceedings.

1 governing principles. First, Congressional intent is the “ultimate touchstone.” *Wyeth v.*
2 *Levine*, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009). Second, in a field the States have traditionally
3 occupied, there is a presumption against preemption based on the notion that “Congress
4 does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action.” *Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr*, 518
5 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).

6 Preemption occurs in three forms: (1) express preemption; (2) field preemption;
7 and (3) conflict preemption. *Ting v. AT&T*, 319 F.3d 1126, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003). Express
8 preemption exists “where Congress enacts an explicit statutory command that state law
9 be displaced.” *Id.* Field and conflict preemption are forms of implied preemption. Field
10 preemption occurs when federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive that it leaves no
11 room for supplementary state regulation. *Hillsborough Cnty., Fla. v. Automated Med.*
12 *Labs., Inc.*, 471 U.S. 707, 712–13 (1985). Conflict preemption occurs when: (1)
13 “compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,” or (2)
14 “state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
15 and objectives of Congress.” *Id.* (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

16 Plaintiffs’ claims are not expressly preempted by federal statute, and prescription
17 drug regulation is a field in which the States have traditionally occupied. *See Reigel v.*
18 *Medtronic, Inc.*, 552 U.S. 312, 327 (2008) (noting Congress could have expressly
19 preempted claims regarding pharmaceutical drugs, but chose not to); *Lefavre v. K.M.*
20 *Pharm., Inc.*, 636 F.3d 935, 941 (8th Cir. 2011)(citing *Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder*
21 *Craft Boats, Inc.*, 489 U.S. 141, 166–67 (1989)(“[T]he FDA [has] long maintained that
22 state law offers an additional, and important, layer of consumer protection that
23 complements FDA regulation.”)). Defendants do not assert Plaintiffs’ claims create an
24 obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of Congress, and thus obstacle preemption is
25 not at issue. As such, the Court’s inquiry will focus on whether concurrent compliance
26 with federal regulations and state tort law is impossible.

27 As an initial matter, at oral argument Plaintiffs challenged whether conflict
28 preemption presents an issue of law or an issue of fact, and whether resolution by

1 summary judgment is appropriate. (*See, e.g.*, Doc. No. 1445 at 64–65, 127:3–22.)
2 Following oral argument, the state court requested additional briefing specific to this
3 issue. (*See* Doc. No. 1502 at 1.) At the agreement of the parties in this case, that briefing
4 was submitted as supplemental authority in these proceedings. (*Id.*) Upon consideration
5 of the arguments presented in the supplemental briefing, relevant authority, and the
6 pending cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court is satisfied that preemption
7 presents purely a question of law appropriate for resolution by summary judgment. *See*
8 *Dobbs v. Wyeth Pharm.*, 797 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1267 (W.D. Okla. 2011) (“Where, as
9 here, the moving party asserts entitlement to judgment because a claim is preempted by
10 federal law, the motion presents only a legal question for the court; if the court concludes
11 that a state law claim is preempted, summary judgment is proper as to that claim.”); *see*
12 *also Bank of Am. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco*, 309 F.3d 551, 566 (9th Cir. 2002)
13 (affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment based on federal conflict
14 preemption). Moreover, Plaintiffs’ affirmative motion for summary judgment in these
15 proceedings supports the Court’s conclusion that summary judgment is appropriate for
16 resolution of Defendants’ conflict preemption defense.

17 ***A. Relevant law***

18 In the context of pharmaceutical drug regulation and state law failure-to-warn
19 claims, the Court is guided by the United States Supreme Court case of *Wyeth v. Levine*,
20 which provides the standard Defendants must prove to establish impossibility
21 preemption. The plaintiff in *Levine* received an injection of the drug Phenergan through
22 the IV push method of administration. *Levine*, 555 U.S. at 559. When the drug was
23 administered, it entered Levine’s artery. *Id.* This caused gangrene and eventually required
24 amputation of her right forearm. *Id.* Levine sued Wyeth, the manufacturer of Phenergan,
25 arguing the drug’s labeling was inadequate because it did not warn that medical
26 professionals should use the IV drip method of administration instead of the IV push
27 method. *Id.* at 560. Wyeth argued Levine’s claims were preempted because it was
28 impossible to comply with state law and the FDA’s labeling requirements. *Id.*

1 Specifically, Wyeth argued it could not unilaterally change Phenergan’s labeling to warn
2 about dangers associated with the IV push method, and only “newly acquired
3 information” implicated the Changes Being Effected (“CBE”) regulation.⁴ *Id.* at 568–69.

4 In analyzing Wyeth’s conflict preemption defense, the Court concluded that initial
5 FDA approval of drug labeling does not preempt a subsequent failure-to-warn claim. *Id.*
6 at 558. Thus, the Court looked beyond initial drug approval and considered several
7 factors as part of its preemption analysis, including: (1) whether Wyeth tried to give the
8 warning sought by Levine and (2) whether it had been precluded from doing so; (3)
9 whether the FDA or the manufacturer focused on the risks associated with IV push versus
10 IV drip administration of Phenergan; and (4) whether Wyeth provided the FDA with an
11 analysis or evaluation of those risks. *Id.* at 572–73. The evidence in *Levine* established
12 Wyeth had not attempted to give a warning specific to IV push administration, and the
13 FDA had not prohibited Wyeth from doing so. *Id.* Additionally, the evidence
14 demonstrated the FDA and Wyeth had given only “passing attention” to the issue raised
15 by Levine’s claim. *Id.* at 572. There was also no evidence that Wyeth provided the FDA
16 with an evaluation of the risks associated with the IV push method of administration. *Id.*
17 at 572–73. Accordingly, the Supreme Court rejected Wyeth’s preemption defense,
18 concluding it was not impossible for Wyeth to provide the warning Levine sought. *Id.* at
19 573.

20 The Court then held that “absent clear evidence that the FDA would not have
21 approved a change to Phenergan’s label” the Court would “not conclude that it was
22 impossible for Wyeth to comply with both federal and state requirements.” *Id.* at 571.
23 *Levine* therefore provides the relevant conflict preemption standard, but does not define
24 what constitutes clear evidence. As such, application of the standard is necessarily fact-

26 ⁴ Through submission of a CBE supplement, a manufacturer may make immediate
27 changes to product labeling without requiring FDA approval of the change prior to
28 product distribution. (*See, e.g.*, Doc. No. 1166-8 at 10 n.9); 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6).

1 specific.⁵ See *Koho v. Forest Labs., Inc.*, 17 F. Supp. 3d 1109, 1118 (W.D. Wash. 2014)
2 (“[T]he clear evidence standard is a fact based inquiry that depends on the express type of
3 warning at issue and the particular facts of each case.”); *Dobbs*, 797 F. Supp. 2d at 1270
4 (explaining that ascertaining conflict preemption is “necessarily fact specific”).

5 The Ninth Circuit addressed conflict preemption in *Gaeta v. Perrigo*
6 *Pharmaceuticals*,⁶ with an analysis similar to that in *Levine*. *Gaeta* involved the generic
7 manufacturer of ibuprofen, Perrigo, and a state law failure-to-warn claim regarding
8 concurrent use of ibuprofen and other drugs known to cause liver toxicity. *Id.* at 1228.
9 Perrigo asserted the plaintiffs’ claims were conflict preempted. *Id.*

10 In support of preemption, Perrigo presented evidence that the FDA considered the
11 general safety of ibuprofen on two separate occasions: once in 2002 in response to a
12 citizen petition and a second time in 2006, when considering what types of warnings
13 should be included in over-the-counter drugs, including ibuprofen. *Id.* at 1236–37. The
14 Ninth Circuit held the FDA’s general reviews of ibuprofen safety did not amount to clear
15 evidence the FDA would not have approved the warnings suggested by the plaintiffs. *Id.*
16 at 1237. The *Gaeta* court cited the lack of evidence that the FDA was presented with and
17 actually considered the specific warning requested by the Gaetas. *Id.* The court also noted
18 Perrigo did not suggest it supplied the FDA with an evaluation or analysis concerning
19 concomitant use of ibuprofen and other drugs, and that the FDA refused to act. *Id.*
20 (quoting *Levine*, 555 U.S. at 572–73). Finding the evidence presented was no more
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22 ⁵ The determination that conflict preemption is a fact-intensive analysis is consistent with
23 the conclusion that it presents only a question of law suitable for determination by the
24 Court through summary judgment. The factual inquiry is limited to what the FDA has
25 done, if anything, in addressing the need for a warning on a particular drug. This is in
26 contrast to considering the specific data relied upon by the FDA. See *infra* § F.

26 ⁶ 630 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2011) *cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. L. Perrigo Co.*
27 *v. Gaeta*, 132 S. Ct. 497 (2011). The Ninth Circuit’s discussion of conflict preemption
28 related to generic drug manufacturers was vacated following the Supreme Court’s
decision in *Pliva v. Mensing*, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011). *Pliva* is inapplicable in this matter
because none of Defendants manufacture generic versions of the drugs at issue.

1 compelling than in *Levine*, the court concluded the Gaeta’s claims were not preempted.
2 *Id.*

3 As binding authority, *Levine* and *Gaeta* principally guide the Court’s analysis.
4 Notably, however, they both represent instances where the clear evidence standard is
5 unsatisfied. At the opposite end of the spectrum are cases finding in favor of preemption.
6 One such case, *Dobbs v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals*, involved the use of selective serotonin
7 reuptake inhibitors (“SSRI”), a class of antidepressants, and an increased risk of suicide.
8 797 F. Supp. 2d at 1266. Although characterized as an outlier by Plaintiffs, *Dobbs*
9 demonstrates facts that meet the clear evidence standard and is useful in framing the
10 continuum of conflict preemption case law.

11 In *Dobbs*, the plaintiff’s husband committed suicide after taking the prescription
12 drug Effexor as treatment for depression. *Id.* At the time of the suicide, Effexor’s labeling
13 and package insert included an FDA-approved statement regarding suicidality in adult
14 patients diagnosed with depression. *Id.* The plaintiff argued the statement was inadequate
15 to warn her husband of suicide risk. *Id.* The record in *Dobbs*, however, reflected
16 extensive consideration by the FDA of an enhanced suicidality warning for adult patients,
17 and the FDA’s consistent conclusion there was “no scientific evidence of a causal
18 association between SSRI’s and increased suicidality warranting an enhanced warning.”
19 *Id.* at 1272–73. The evidence also established that following Effexor’s initial approval,
20 the FDA rejected citizen petitions asking for enhanced suicide warnings for Prozac, a
21 different antidepressant, but within the SSRI class of drugs. *Id.* at 1274. In rejecting each
22 citizen petition, the FDA cited insufficient evidence of an association between the SSRI
23 and suicide risk. *Id.* Wyeth also demonstrated the FDA’s position regarding an increased
24 risk of suicide in adults did not change before or after the decedent’s suicide. *Id.* Relying
25 on the FDA’s opinions that an enhanced suicidality warning was unsupported by
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1 scientific data and the consistency of that opinion, the court concluded the plaintiff's
2 claims were conflict preempted. *Id.* at 1277.⁷

3 A more recent case, *Rheinfrank v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc.*, No. 1:13cv114, 2015
4 WL 4743056 (S.D. Ohio, Aug. 10, 2015), also found the clear evidence standard
5 satisfied. The plaintiff in *Rheinfrank* sued the manufacturer of an anti-epileptic drug
6 taken during her pregnancy that resulted in developmental delay and other physical and
7 cognitive injuries to her child. *Id.* at *2. In support of preemption, the manufacturer
8 argued it sought FDA approval to add a developmental delay warning in the years after
9 the plaintiff took the drug, but that the FDA concluded the scientific evidence was
10 insufficient to support a warning. *Id.* at *6. The court concluded the FDA's consideration
11 of the safety issue, and its failure to issue a labeling change in the years following the
12 plaintiff's injury, constituted clear evidence the FDA would have rejected a label change
13 at the time the plaintiff consumed the drug. *Id.* at *10.

14 Similarly, in *Reckis v. Johnson & Johnson*, 471 Mass. 272 (2015),⁸ the court found
15 the plaintiffs' claims partially preempted in light of the FDA's rejection of a warning
16 sought by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs' daughter suffered from Stevens-Johnson
17 syndrome ("SJS") and toxic epidermal necrolysis ("TEN") after consuming Children's
18 Motrin. *Id.* at 275. At the time the child took Motrin, the warnings section of the FDA-
19 approved label contained an allergy alert warning that ibuprofen could cause an allergic
20 reaction, but did not specifically reference SJS or TEN. *Id.* at 279. The manufacturer
21 argued the plaintiffs' claims were conflict preempted. *Id.* at 281.

22 The record established that in the years after the incident, the FDA received a
23 citizen petition concerning the relationship between ibuprofen and SJS and TEN. *Id.* at
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26 ⁷ Though *Dobbs* found cases regarding other drugs unpersuasive in its preemption
27 analysis, the Court necessarily looks to cases regarding different pharmaceutical products
28 in framing its analysis, and notes the parties take the same approach throughout their
briefing.

⁸ *petition for cert. docketed*, 15-449 (U.S. Oct. 9, 2015).

1 280. Following receipt of the petition, the FDA engaged in a “comprehensive review of
2 the risks and benefits of ibuprofen, including the risks of SJS and TEN[.]” *Id.* (internal
3 citation and quotation marks omitted). In the FDA’s formal response to the citizen
4 petition, the FDA agreed with the petitioners that labeling should be improved, but
5 declined to include the specific terms SJS and TEN, concluding consumers were
6 unfamiliar with those terms. *Id.* Relying on the citizen petition rejection, the court
7 concluded the plaintiffs’ claims specific to a warning regarding SJS and TEN were
8 preempted, but claims related to a more general warning were not preempted. *Id.* at 290;
9 *see also Robinson v. McNeil Consumer Healthcare*, 615 F.3d 861, 873 (7th Cir. 2010)
10 (noting “[t]he ‘clear evidence’ in this case is the agency’s refusal to require a reference to
11 SJS/TEN on the label of over-the-counter drugs containing ibuprofen, when it had been
12 asked to do in a submission to which the agency was responding”).⁹

13 *In re Fosamax Products Liability Litigation*, 951 F. Supp. 2d 695 (D.N.J. 2013),
14 also presents an example of where a manufacturer established conflict preemption. In that
15 case, the plaintiff was prescribed the drug Fosamax for the treatment of osteoporosis. *Id.*
16 at 697. After taking the drug for several years, the plaintiff suffered a fracture in her right
17 femur. *Id.* The plaintiff then filed suit against the manufacturer alleging it failed to
18 adequately warn of risks associated with the use of Fosamax. *Id.* at 700. The
19 manufacturer argued the plaintiff’s claims were preempted because the FDA rejected a
20 prior approval supplement (“PAS”)¹⁰ from the manufacturer that warned of femur
21 fracture risk after the plaintiff’s injury. *Id.* at 701, 703. The court agreed, concluding the
22 FDA would not have approved a change to the Fosamax label prior to the plaintiff’s
23

24 ⁹ Defendants cited *Rheinfrank*, *Reckis*, and *Robinson* for the first time at oral argument.
25 As recent decisions finding clear evidence the FDA would reject a proposed labeling
26 change, the decisions are helpful to the Court’s analysis to the extent they establish a
27 lower threshold for a finding of preemption than that proposed by Plaintiffs.

28 ¹⁰ A manufacturer may utilize a PAS to propose changes that require FDA approval prior
to distribution of the product with those changes. (*See* 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b); Doc. No.
1166-8 at 10 n.9.)

1 injury given the FDA's rejection of the PAS with an enhanced warning only one month
2 after the plaintiff's injury. *Id.* at 703. Finding the FDA's rejection constituted clear
3 evidence under *Levine*, the court concluded plaintiff's claims were conflict preempted. *Id.*

4 Another case instructive to this Court's analysis is the Seventh Circuit's decision in
5 *Mason v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.*, 596 F.3d 387 (7th Cir. 2010), where the court
6 concluded citizen petition rejections did not constitute clear evidence the FDA would
7 reject a proposed warning. *Mason* involved the SSRI Paxil, and allegations the
8 manufacturer failed to warn the drug caused an increased risk of suicide, particularly in
9 young adults. *Id.* at 389. Citing the temporal gap between citizen petition rejections and
10 the decedent's suicide, as well as the FDA's evolving opinion regarding pediatric
11 suicidality, the court found it unlikely the FDA would have prevented the manufacturer
12 from warning about suicide risk in young adults. *Id.* at 395 (noting the latest of the FDA's
13 opinions regarding suicidality occurred several years before the decedent's suicide); *see*
14 *also Forst v. Smithkline Beecham Corp.*, 639 F. Supp. 2d 948 (E.D. Wis. 2009) (rejecting
15 similar arguments as those advanced in *Mason* regarding the SSRI Prozac and
16 distinguished by the court in *Dobbs*).

17 In *Dorsett v. Sandoz*, another SSRI case, the court similarly declined to rely on
18 citizen petition rejections several years prior to the decedent's suicide as establishing
19 preemption. 699 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (C.D. Cal. 2010). *Dorsett* involved a twenty-six year
20 old man who committed suicide after taking a generic for the prescription drug Prozac.
21 *Id.* at 1145. The manufacturer cited the FDA's rejection of a citizen petition requesting an
22 enhanced warning as clear evidence the FDA would have rejected a label change. *Id.* at
23 1157. The court concluded the FDA's rejection of citizen petitions in the 1990s did not
24 establish what the FDA would have done in response to a label change request in 2004.
25 *Id.* The court also cited developments in scientific knowledge regarding SSRIs and
26 suicidality leading up to the time of the suicide as weighing against preemption. *Id.* at
27 1157–58. Thus, the court concluded clear evidence did not exist that the FDA would have
28 rejected an enhanced warning at the time of the suicide. *Id.* at 1158.

1 In *Koho v. Forest Laboratories, Inc.*, the court reached a similar conclusion. 17 F.
2 Supp. 3d at 1109. In *Koho*, the plaintiff argued the manufacturer of the antidepressant
3 Celexa should have included a warning about an increase in suicidal thoughts and
4 emphasized the importance of communicating that risk to family members through
5 product labeling. *Id.* at 1116–17. The manufacturer argued the plaintiff’s claims were
6 preempted and cited the FDA’s rejection of three citizen petitions seeking an enhanced
7 suicidality warning as support. *Id.* at 1117. The court found the FDA’s rejection of citizen
8 petitions unpersuasive, noting the most recent rejection, which occurred five years prior
9 to the decedent’s suicide, did not constitute clear evidence of what the FDA would have
10 done at the time the decedent was prescribed Celexa. *Id.* The court also cited to
11 subsequently implemented labeling that provided a warning similar to that sought by the
12 plaintiff as weighing against preemption. *Id.* at 1119. Additionally, the court considered
13 the similarities between the warnings rejected by the FDA in the citizen petitions and the
14 warning sought by the plaintiff. *Id.* at 1116-17. Concluding the warnings were different—
15 the plaintiff seeking a warning directed at family members of those taking the drug as
16 opposed to a warning directed at the patient—the court found the plaintiff’s claims were
17 not conflict preempted. *Id.* at 1119.

18 Although the clear evidence standard remains undefined, these cases provide a
19 framework from which the Court can apply *Levine* and its progeny to the facts in this
20 matter. With *Levine* and *Gaeta* as examples of what is insufficient to warrant conflict
21 preemption and *Dobbs* demonstrative of facts sufficient to establish the demanding
22 defense, the Court must determine how the facts of this matter compare. Before doing so,
23 however, the Court considers the federal regulatory construct within which Plaintiffs’
24 claims arise.

25 ***B. Overview of federal drug regulation***

26 Initial FDA approval of a drug is predicated, in part, on a manufacturer’s use of
27 FDA approved product labeling and package inserts. *See* 21 U.S.C. § 355; 21 C.F.R. §
28 314.105(b). Following approval, the FDA can require postmarketing studies and drug

1 surveillance, and manufacturers have an ongoing duty to report the results of studies and
2 drug surveillance to the FDA. 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(1); 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.80, 314.81;
3 *Dobbs*, 797 F. Supp. 2d at 1270 (“After a drug is approved by the FDA, manufacturers
4 are required to maintain records, conduct additional testing as directed, and report to the
5 FDA any significant adverse health consequences reported during the prescription drug’s
6 use.”). The FDA is also responsible for continually monitoring the safety of approved
7 drugs and may take action including withdrawal of approval if scientific data indicates a
8 drug is unsafe. *See* 21 U.S.C. § 355(e).

9 Despite the FDA’s ongoing regulatory role, drug manufacturers must maintain
10 adequate product labeling in light of post-approval drug surveillance. *Levine* emphasized
11 that a manufacturer bears the burden of maintaining the adequacy of product labeling at
12 all times. *Levine*, 555 U.S. at 571 (noting manufacturers are charged with “crafting an
13 adequate label and [] ensuring that its warnings remain adequate as long as the drug is on
14 the market”). The CBE regulation permits manufacturers to reconcile this duty with the
15 FDA’s required approval of drug labeling by permitting a manufacturer to make
16 immediate changes to product labeling without requiring FDA approval of the change
17 prior to product distribution. (*See e.g.*, Doc. No. 1166-8 at 10 n.9); 21 C.F.R. §
18 314.70(c)(6). A manufacturer may submit a CBE based on “newly acquired information,”
19 which “encompasses new analyses of previously submitted data.” *Levine*, 555 U.S. at
20 569.

21 A warning must be supported by “reasonable evidence of a causal association.” 21
22 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(6). A variety of sources can satisfy this standard, including adverse
23 event rate,¹¹ evidence of a dose-response relationship, and the temporal association

25 ¹¹ FDA Guidance for Industry defines an adverse event as “any untoward medical event
26 associated with the use of a drug in humans, whether or not considered drug-related.”
27 (Doc. No. 1166-77 at 17); *see also* 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(a). Reports of adverse events, also
28 referred to as spontaneous reporting, can be made even if the reporter is not certain that a
product caused the medical event. (*See* Doc. No. 597 at 9) (citing FDA Adverse Event

1 between drug administration and the event. (Doc. No. 1166-11 at 6.) Federal regulations
2 do not require that a causal association between a drug and a particular outcome be
3 definitely established before it is added to product labeling as a warning. *See* 21 C.F.R. §
4 201.57(c)(i). A manufacturer is required to update its labeling as soon as reasonable
5 evidence of a causal association exists. *Id.* §201.80(e). To include an adverse reaction in
6 product labeling, federal regulations require there be some basis to believe there is a
7 causal association. *Id.* § 201.57(c)(7).

8 The FDA also has the authority to mandate a labeling change if it learns of new
9 safety information that it thinks should be included in the labeling of a drug. *See* 21
10 U.S.C. § 355(o)(4)(a). Similarly, the FDA can reject a CBE and require a manufacturer to
11 remove the newly added language from its labeling. *See Levine*, 555 U.S. at 571.
12 Unapproved labeling could be considered misbranded and subject to an FDA
13 enforcement action. In practice, however, manufacturers often consult with the FDA
14 about labeling issues prior to and after submission of a CBE, making an FDA
15 enforcement action improbable. *Id.* at 570 (“[T]he very idea that the FDA would bring an
16 enforcement action against a manufacturer for strengthening a warning pursuant to the
17 CBE regulation is difficult to accept.”).

18 Against this regulatory backdrop, the Court turns to the arguments and evidence
19 offered by the instant cross-motions for summary judgment.

20 ***C. Clear evidence exists that the FDA would have rejected a pancreatic cancer***
21 ***reference in the product labeling***

22 The parties raise several arguments both for and against preemption. Defendants
23 assert they have established it would be impossible to comply with federal labeling
24 requirements and state tort law, given the FDA’s opinions regarding a causal association
25

26 _____
27 Reporting System (FAERS)
28 [http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Surveillance/
AdverseDrugEffects/default.htm](http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Surveillance/AdverseDrugEffects/default.htm) (last updated Sept. 10, 2012)).

1 between the drugs and pancreatic cancer. As support for this argument, Defendants cite
2 seven instances where the FDA has taken a position regarding pancreatic safety: (1)
3 issuance of the FDA’s February 2014 assessment of pancreatic safety in the *New England*
4 *Journal of Medicine*; (2) the FDA’s rejection of a citizen petition requesting the
5 withdrawal of Victoza; (3) the FDA’s September 2014 conclusion that a causal
6 association between incretin mimetics and pancreatic cancer is indeterminate; and (4)–(7)
7 the subsequent approval of other incretin-based therapies without any reference to
8 pancreatic cancer in the product labeling. (*See* Doc. No. 1445 at 9:21–25.) According to
9 Defendants, each instance represents the FDA’s opinion regarding pancreatic safety and
10 its conclusion that current data does not support a pancreatic cancer reference.

11 Plaintiffs argue that absent actual and express rejection of a pancreatic cancer
12 reference by the FDA, Defendants cannot establish clear evidence. Plaintiffs also contend
13 that Defendants are aware of scientific evidence that satisfies the regulatory standards for
14 inclusion of pancreatic cancer as a warning or adverse reaction. Though Defendants have
15 not submitted a CBE or PAS, the evidence establishes the FDA has been aware of a
16 pancreatic cancer safety signal¹² for several years, and actively investigated the existence
17 of a causal relationship between the drugs and pancreatic cancer. (*See* Doc. No. 1163-3 at
18 73–74) (acknowledging the FDA has evaluated a pancreatic cancer safety signal for
19 several years).

20 In 2009, the FDA reviewed its adverse event reporting system database for
21 incidences of pancreatic cancer associated with Byetta, Januvia, and other antidiabetic
22 therapies. (Doc. No. 1163-4 at 68–70.) After reviewing the database, the FDA concluded
23 that “little inference for risk” could be appreciated from reviewing spontaneous reports of
24

25 ¹² FDA Guidance for Industry defines a safety signal as “a concern about an excess of
26 adverse events compared to what would be expected to be associated with a product’s
27 use,” which can arise from “postmarketing data and other sources, such as preclinical
28 data and events associated with other products in the same pharmacologic class.” (Doc.
No. 554-9 at 8.)

1 pancreatic cancer, and that a causal association between the drugs and pancreatic cancer
2 was indeterminate. (*Id.* at 80.) Based on that conclusion, the FDA did not make any
3 labeling recommendations with respect to Byetta or Januvia. (*Id.*)

4 In April 2012, the FDA again considered pancreatic cancer risk in evaluating a
5 citizen petition that called for the FDA to withdraw Victoza from the market. (Doc. No.
6 1163-3 at 25–52.) The petition cited adverse event data as demonstrative of an increased
7 risk of pancreatic cancer. (*Id.* at 50.) Before responding to the citizen petition, the FDA
8 issued a drug safety communication in March 2013 that directly related to pancreatic
9 cancer risk associated with incretin mimetics. (Doc. No. 1163-4 at 85.) In the
10 communication, the FDA stated it was “investigating reports of possible increased risk of
11 pancreatitis and pre-cancerous findings of the pancreas from incretin mimetic drugs for
12 type 2 diabetes.” (*Id.*) The communication indicated the FDA would “obtain and
13 evaluate” the new information and “communicate its final conclusions and
14 recommendations when its review is complete or when the Agency has additional
15 information to report.” (*Id.*) The FDA concluded the communication by stating it had not
16 reached a new conclusion regarding pancreatic cancer risk, and advised health care
17 professionals to continue following the prescribing recommendations in the drug
18 labeling. (*Id.*)

19 As part of its review of incretin mimetics and pancreatic cancer risk, the FDA
20 participated in the National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive Kidney Diseases and
21 National Cancer Institute’s workshop on Pancreatitis-Diabetes-Pancreatic Cancer in June
22 2013. (*Id.* at 88–94.) At the workshop, the FDA again acknowledged that adverse event
23 data was “less suitable for detecting relatively more common events with long latency
24 periods” such as pancreatic cancer. (Doc. No. 1163-4 at 90.) An FDA supervisory
25 toxicologist at the workshop commented that incretin-based drugs were not associated
26 with “overt pancreatic toxicity or pancreatic neoplasms . . . that would indicate a risk to
27 human safety.” (*Id.* at 89.) Moreover, the FDA acknowledged that sponsors of exenatide
28 (Byetta), liraglutide (Victoza), and sitagliptin (Januvia and Janumet) completed

1 postmarketing pancreatic toxicology studies, which did not “definitively demonstrate[] a
2 treatment-related adverse effect on exocrine histology or proliferation.” (*Id.*)

3 Then, in February 2014, the FDA published its assessment of pancreatic safety in
4 the *New England Journal of Medicine*. (Doc. No. 1163-3 at 4.) The article, titled
5 “Pancreatic Safety of Incretin Mimetics–FDA and EMA Assessment” (“Assessment”),
6 was authored by four FDA officials and members of the European Medicines Agency.
7 (Doc. No. 1163 at 3.) As part of the Assessment, the FDA engaged in a comprehensive
8 review of data including completion and review of its own pancreatic toxicity studies.
9 (*Id.*) The FDA also reviewed clinical safety databases and the results of cardiovascular
10 outcome trials in patients with type 2 diabetes who were treated with incretin-based
11 drugs. (*Id.*) The Assessment directly addressed the relevance of pancreatic cancer adverse
12 event reports, noting “inherent limitations to the ability to establish causal relationships”
13 due to the high background rate and long latency period of pancreatic cancer.¹³ (*Id.* at 2.)
14 In conclusion, the FDA stated, “assertions concerning a causal association between
15 incretin-based drugs and pancreatitis or pancreatic cancer, as expressed recently in the
16 scientific literature and in the media, are inconsistent with the current data.” (*Id.*) The
17 FDA also concluded the “current knowledge is adequately reflected in the product
18 information or labeling” which did not warn of pancreatic cancer or list pancreatic cancer
19 as an adverse reaction. (*Id.*)¹⁴

23 ¹³ The FDA has recognized that adverse event reports have limited value in assessing a
24 causal relationship because the National Cancer Institute does not characterize pancreatic
25 cancer as a “rare” cancer, it has a long latency period, and shares risk factors recognized
26 in patients with type 2 diabetes. (*See* Doc. No. 1163-4 at 73–74.) The National Cancer
27 Institute characterizes a cancer as “rare” if there are fewer than 35,000 total cases per
28 year. (*Id.* at 73.) The National Cancer Institute defines latency period as the time that
passes between being exposed to something that can cause disease and having symptoms.

¹⁴ The Assessment was updated with non-substantive information on June 5, 2014. (Doc.
No. 1163-4 at 96.)

1 In March 2014, the FDA formally responded to the 2012 Victoza citizen petition.
2 (Doc. No. 1163-3 at 25–61.) In doing so, the FDA rejected adverse event data as
3 evidence of a causal association between Victoza and pancreatic cancer. (*Id.* at 50.) (“In
4 our review of 49 unique cases recovered from [FDA Adverse Event Reporting System]
5 we found no new evidence regarding the risk of pancreatic carcinoma in association with
6 the use of Victoza that would support any changes to the current approved labeling.”).
7 The FDA also stated “[a]ny causal association between exposure to Victoza and
8 pancreatic cancer is indeterminate at this time.” (*Id.*) Based on these conclusions, the
9 FDA made no labeling recommendations specific to pancreatic cancer.

10 In September 2014, the FDA again reviewed pancreatic safety concerns in
11 considering the safety of a higher dose of Victoza, marketed for weight loss as Saxenda.
12 As part of a briefing document, the FDA acknowledged that pancreatic cancer had been
13 “hypothesized but not proven” as a risk associated with incretin mimetics, and that
14 “animal observations and clinical trial data reviewed by the FDA to date have not
15 supported a causal association.” (Doc. No. 1163-3 at 66.) The FDA also reiterated its
16 earlier conclusion that studies were “inconclusive” as to a causal association between
17 incretin mimetics and pancreatic cancer. (*Id.*) More recently, the FDA has reviewed
18 pancreatic safety in connection with the approval of other incretin-based therapies not at
19 issue in this litigation. None of the newly approved drugs reference pancreatic cancer in
20 the product labeling. (*See, e.g.*, Doc. No. 1163-4 at 30, 35, 49, 64 Exs. N, O, P, Q.)

21 These facts establish the FDA has considered pancreatic cancer risk, the specific
22 issue Plaintiffs allege Defendants should have warned of or otherwise referenced in their
23 product labeling. This is clearly distinguishable from the facts presented and found
24 insufficient for preemption in *Levine* and *Gaeta*. In *Levine*, the FDA lacked a meaningful
25 review of the risk implicated by the plaintiff’s claims, and in *Gaeta*, although the FDA
26 had considered the general safety of ibuprofen, it had not considered the specific risk
27 challenged by the plaintiffs. Though Plaintiffs argue the FDA’s conclusion in the
28 Assessment did not consider the totality of available scientific data, the Assessment

1 refutes this argument in light of the FDA’s “comprehensive review” of “multiple streams
2 of data” related to pancreatic safety. (Doc. No. 1163-3 at 4.)

3 In addition to considering the specific issue raised by Plaintiffs, the FDA has also
4 consistently concluded that a causal association between the drugs and pancreatic cancer
5 is indeterminate. This falls below the science-based regulatory standards that govern what
6 must be included in product labeling. *See* 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(6) (requiring reasonable
7 evidence of a causal association); *id.* § 201.57(c)(7) (requiring some basis to believe there
8 is a causal association). The FDA acknowledged as much in the Assessment by stating
9 that product labeling was adequate, particularly as none of the drugs referenced
10 pancreatic cancer. (*See* Doc. No. 1163-3 at 76–77.)

11 The FDA’s subsequent inaction regarding drug labeling supports the conclusion
12 that the FDA does not consider available scientific evidence of a causal association
13 sufficient to warrant inclusion in the labeling. For example, the FDA has not
14 communicated further regarding pancreatic cancer risk, or taken any actions inconsistent
15 with its prior conclusion that the labeling is adequate. The FDA has also not required any
16 of the Defendants to add a pancreatic cancer warning, or required the inclusion of a
17 warning in newly approved incretin-based therapies. While FDA inaction is insufficient
18 on its own to establish preemption, it is highly persuasive given the FDA’s
19 comprehensive review of pancreatic safety and ability to mandate a labeling change if it
20 concluded the regulatory standards were satisfied.¹⁵ *Cf. Gaeta*, 603 F. 3d at 1237 (noting
21

22 ¹⁵ Defendants argue the 2007 amendment to the FDCA that gave the FDA explicit power
23 to mandate a change in product labeling “changes the ‘clear evidence’ analysis.” (Doc.
24 No. 1289 at 4–5.) Plaintiffs take issue with this characterization and emphasize the
25 difference between the FDA mandating a label change and the FDA permitting a label
26 change submitted by a manufacturer. (*See* Doc. No. 1445 at 48:3–6.) While the Court
27 does not find the 2007 amendment authorizing the FDA to mandate a label change alters
28 the clear evidence analysis as set forth in *Levine*, the Court does find the FDA’s failure to
mandate a labeling change after reviewing data related to pancreatic cancer persuasive in
reaching its conclusion that clear evidence exists.

1 Perrigo did not suggest it supplied the FDA with an evaluation of the specific issue raised
2 by the plaintiffs' claims and that the FDA refused to act). That is not to say the Court's
3 finding of clear evidence is solely based on the FDA's inaction. It is the FDA's failure to
4 act coupled with its substantial review of the issue posed by Plaintiffs' claims that the
5 Court finds persuasive.¹⁶ When considered in its entirety, and in connection with federal
6 regulatory standards governing product labeling, the record establishes the FDA would
7 have rejected a pancreatic cancer label change, having found on more than one occasion
8 that scientific evidence did not support such a reference.

9 In reaching its conclusion that clear evidence exists, the Court rejects Plaintiffs'
10 position that Defendants cannot establish preemption absent express rejection of a
11 proposed labeling change. Plaintiffs overstate the burden imposed by *Levine*, arguing
12 Defendants can establish preemption only by proving: “*if they had conferred with the*
13 *FDA, and if they had provided an accurate analysis of the specific evidence concerning*
14 *pancreatic cancer, and if they had submitted a properly-supported CBE, then the FDA*
15 *would be so strongly opposed to the warning that it would reject the proposed warning*
16 *and bring an unprecedented enforcement action against the Defendants.*” (Doc. No. 1165-
17 1 at 13) (emphases in original). Though a CBE or PAS submission and rejection would
18 readily meet the clear evidence standard, it is not the only means by which a
19 manufacturer can establish conflict preemption. *See Reckis*, 471 Mass. at 290 n.29. (“The
20 court in *Wyeth* specifically suggested that ‘clear evidence’ could be established by the
21 FDA’s rejection of a drug maker’s attempt to give the warning underlying a claim of
22 failure to warn. That is not to say that the *Wyeth* standard of clear evidence can be
23

24 ¹⁶ Also notable is the timing of the FDA’s reviews of pancreatic safety, which spanned
25 from as early as 2009 through the end of 2014, encompassing the times when Plaintiffs in
26 this multidistrict litigation were prescribed and consumed the drugs. This is different
27 from cases such as *Mason* and *Koho* which recognized significant gaps in time between
28 the FDA’s review of a safety issue and the plaintiffs’ failure to warn claims as precluding
a finding the plaintiffs’ claims were preempted.

1 satisfied only by the FDA’s rejection of a manufacturer’s request for an additional
2 warning.”).¹⁷

3 The language in *Levine* supports this conclusion. The Supreme Court stated a
4 manufacturer must demonstrate by clear evidence the FDA *would* have rejected a label
5 change, not whether the FDA *did* reject the labeling change sought by a plaintiff.
6 Moreover, although *Levine* emphasized the importance of the CBE provision as related to
7 a manufacturer’s responsibility to maintain adequate labeling, Defendants do not argue
8 the CBE provision is unavailable to them. Instead, and contrary to Wyeth’s position in
9 *Levine*, Defendants argue CBE submission is unnecessary as opposed to unavailable.

10 The authority Plaintiffs cite as support for this argument are unpersuasive as those
11 cases do not present facts as compelling as the instant matter, and do not singularly
12 analyze whether the manufacturer submitted a proposed warning that the FDA rejected.
13 For example, in *Dobbs*, the court found submission of a pediatric suicidality warning and
14 the FDA’s rejection of that warning highly persuasive in finding the plaintiff’s claims
15 preempted. 797 F. Supp. 2d at 1277. However, the CBE submission was not specific to
16 the plaintiff’s claim, which focused on warning of an increased risk of suicide in adults.
17 *Id.* In addition to the rejection of a pediatric suicide warning, the court also cited the
18 FDA’s consistent opinion that scientific evidence did not support a warning for adult
19 patients in concluding the plaintiff’s claims were preempted. *See id.* at 1276 (“More
20 important in the context of this case, however, is the FDA’s repeated refusal to extend
21 suicidality warnings to adult patients over the age of 25.”). Thus, while *Dobbs* found the
22 FDA’s rejection of a pediatric warning highly persuasive, it does not support the
23

24
25 ¹⁷ Plaintiffs’ bright line rule for conflict preemption requiring submission of a proposed
26 label change is also contrary to the wealth of case law acknowledging the clear evidence
27 standard remains undefined and requires a fact-intensive analysis. *See, e.g., Gaeta*, 630
28 F.3d at 1235 (“The Court, however, did not clarify what would amount to ‘clear
evidence.’ Rather, the only guidance this court has is that the evidence presented in
Levine was insufficient to meet the clear evidence standard.”).

1 conclusion that *Levine* requires a manufacturer to submit a label change to establish a
2 plaintiff's claims are conflict preempted. *See also In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium)*
3 *Products Liab. Litig.*, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 703 (finding preemption based on PAS
4 submission, but recognizing the clear evidence standard is undefined); *In re Actos*
5 *(Pioglitazone) Products Liab. Litig.*, No. 6:11MD2299, 2014 WL 4364832, at *20 (W.D.
6 La. Sept. 2, 2014) (rejecting manufacturer's preemption defense in light of substantial
7 evidence that the manufacturer rejected the FDA's efforts to require a stronger warning).

8 Moreover, although Plaintiffs argue a defendant must submit a CBE or PAS to
9 warrant preemption, Plaintiffs do not establish the FDA's substantial review of pancreatic
10 safety was different from what the FDA would have done in response to a CBE.¹⁸ (*See,*
11 *e.g.*, Doc. Nos. 1166-8 at 8; 1166-24 at 8) (explaining how the FDA evaluates new safety
12 information and drug safety information). In fact, the record suggests the FDA's review
13 of pancreatic safety was more thorough than a review of relevant data offered in
14 connection with a CBE or PAS. Instead of reviewing data submitted by an individual
15 manufacturer, the FDA considered a variety of data sources related to the entire class of
16 incretin mimetics. It also conducted its own studies and reevaluated data submitted by
17 manufacturers in reaching its conclusions. If Defendants *had* submitted a CBE or PAS,
18 which the FDA subsequently rejected, clear evidence would exist and Plaintiffs' claims
19 would be conflict preempted. The facts of this matter are different in form only. Although
20 there was no CBE or PAS submission, the FDA conducted an independent review of
21 pancreatic safety and concluded scientific evidence did not support any changes to the
22

23
24 ¹⁸ Plaintiffs do argue that the FDA affords deference to the views of a manufacturer, and
25 that a "properly supported" CBE would establish either reasonable evidence of a causal
26 association or some basis to believe there is a causal association. This deference,
27 however, does not change the regulatory standard the FDA would apply in analyzing a
28 manufacturer's CBE supplement. Regardless of what prompts the FDA's review of an
issue, whether as part of initial drug approval, a CBE submission, or the FDA's own
review of a safety signal, the same regulatory standard applies. (*See* Doc. Nos. 1163-3 at
82-83; 1164-4 at 123.)

1 product labeling. This is precisely what the FDA would have done upon receipt of a
2 proposed warning by Defendants. In relying on the Assessment and the FDA’s rejection
3 of the Victoza citizen petition, Defendants offer more than a hypothetical assumption
4 about what the FDA would have done in response to a pancreatic cancer label
5 submission. *Cf. Dorsett*, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 1159 (finding the plaintiff’s claims not
6 preempted and noting “[d]efendants offer nothing but theoretical assumptions of what the
7 FDA would have done, and that is not enough to warrant a finding of preemption”). The
8 FDA’s conclusions should not be subject to reevaluation simply because they were not
9 articulated in connection with a CBE or PAS rejection.

10 For these reasons, the Court finds Defendants have established by clear evidence
11 that the FDA would reject a pancreatic cancer labeling change, and that *Levine* does not
12 require CBE submission and rejection. *See Robinson*, 615 F.3d at 873 (“The FDA
13 decided not to require such a warning . . . and a court cannot order a drug company to
14 place on a label a warning if there is ‘clear evidence’ that the FDA would not approve
15 it.”).

16 ***D. The FDA has expressed its official position regarding pancreatic safety***

17 Plaintiffs assert the Assessment, citizen petition response, and Saxenda briefing
18 document do not represent the FDA’s official position regarding the pancreatic safety of
19 incretin mimetics. Plaintiffs cite to a recent Ninth Circuit case, *Reid v Johnson &*
20 *Johnson*, 780 F.3d 952, 955 (9th Cir. 2015), in arguing statements by FDA staff members
21 and the FDA itself are not entitled to preemptive effect if those statements lack the force
22 and effect of law.

23 In *Reid*, the Ninth Circuit considered whether a plaintiff’s claims were conflict
24 preempted under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act as related to nutritional
25 labeling on food products. The court in *Reid* reiterated that a “federal agency acting
26 within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority may . . . render unenforceable
27 state or local law.” The Ninth Circuit then went on to analyze whether an FDA letter was
28 entitled to preemptive effect, and in doing so, analyzed when agency action is entitled to

1 controlling weight. *See id.* at 964 (citing to *Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.*
2 *Council, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984) and *United States v. Mead Corp.*, 533 U.S.
3 218, 234 (2001)). The preemption analysis set forth in *Reid* is inapplicable in this matter,
4 and the Court does not view the parties as arguing *Reid* provides a relevant conflict
5 preemption standard. *Reid* is relevant, however, with respect to whether the FDA was
6 acting in the course of its congressionally delegated authority in reviewing and
7 commenting on the pancreatic safety of incretin mimetics. If answered affirmatively, the
8 FDA action in this case would be entitled to preemptive effect. Thus, the appropriate
9 question is whether the FDA was acting within the scope of its regulatory authority in
10 reviewing pancreatic safety and commenting on the labeling of incretin mimetics.

11 The FDA’s review of pancreatic safety data of the drugs at issue falls squarely
12 within the FDA’s congressionally delegated authority to regulate the safety of
13 prescription drugs. The Assessment exemplifies the FDA’s approach in discharging its
14 regulatory duties. Four FDA officials authored the Assessment, and the Assessment is
15 identified as coming from the FDA’s Office of New Drugs, Center for Drug Evaluation
16 and Research. Additionally, the Assessment is written from the FDA’s perspective and
17 lacks the disclaimer required when publications of FDA employees do not necessarily
18 reflect the opinions of the agency. (*See* Doc. No. 1163-4 at 98) (noting all non-assigned
19 FDA-related articles or speeches must include a disclaimer stating the article “reflects the
20 views of the author and should not be construed to represent FDA’s views or policies”).
21 Plaintiffs’ regulatory expert acknowledges the Assessment represents the FDA’s official
22 position regarding pancreatic safety. (Doc. No. 1163-3 at 85:1–16.) Similarly, responding
23 to citizen petitions is within the FDA’s regulatory authority. The Victoza citizen petition
24 rejection was written by the Director of the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and
25 Research, and constitutes the FDA’s official response to the request to withdraw Victoza
26 from the market. Other courts to address conflict preemption have considered citizen
27 petition responses as indicative of whether the FDA would reject a proposed labeling
28

1 change. *See, e.g., Mason*, 596 F.3d at 395 (considering citizen petitions in clear evidence
2 analysis); *Koho*, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 1117 (same); *Dorsett*, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 1157 (same).

3 With respect to the Saxenda briefing document, Plaintiffs note the prominent
4 disclaimer that the information contained within the document may not represent the
5 FDA’s official position. (*See* Doc. No. 1219-2 at 4) (stating the conclusions and
6 recommendations in the document “do not necessarily represent the final position of the
7 individual reviewers, nor do they necessarily represent the final position of the Review
8 Division or Office” of the FDA). However, the document contains the same conclusion
9 regarding a causal relationship as that expressed in the Assessment and the citizen
10 petition response, namely that a causal association between the drugs and pancreatic
11 cancer had yet to be established. Thus, even if the FDA did not intend the Saxenda
12 briefing document to be an official representation of the FDA’s opinion, it is relevant to
13 the clear evidence analysis to the extent it confirms the FDA’s previously expressed
14 conclusions.

15 As such, the Court finds the Assessment and citizen petition response constitute the
16 FDA’s official position regarding pancreatic safety, as both fall within the FDA’s
17 congressionally delegated regulatory authority. The Court therefore properly considers
18 the FDA’s conclusions regarding a causal association between incretin mimetics and
19 pancreatic cancer, and its statements specific to the adequacy of product labeling, as the
20 basis of Defendants’ preemption defense.

21 ***E. The FDA’s ongoing review of pancreatic safety and the existence of a***
22 ***pancreatic cancer safety signal do not preclude preemption***

23 Plaintiffs also argue the FDA has not reached a final conclusion about the
24 pancreatic safety of incretin mimetics, and that the FDA’s pancreatic cancer safety signal
25 remains open. According to Plaintiffs, the open safety signal indicates there is some basis
26 to believe there is a causal association, and thus Defendants should have included
27 pancreatic cancer as an adverse reaction in product labeling.

1 Although Plaintiffs place significant weight on these facts, the existence of an open
2 safety signal and the FDA’s ongoing review of pancreatic safety do not undermine the
3 FDA’s previously articulated conclusions. The existence of a safety signal is not, without
4 more, indicative of a causal association. FDA Guidance for Industry recognizes that
5 “signal generation is [] only the first step in pharmacovigilance and indicates the need for
6 further investigation *before any conclusions are drawn.*” (Doc. No. 1163-4 at 128)
7 (emphasis added). Defendants’ expert similarly acknowledged, “a safety signal generated
8 through adverse event data mining is simply an indication that a drug might be associated
9 with a particular risk and that further study is warranted,” and that “[i]n general, a safety
10 signal is not itself evidence of a causal association between a drug and an adverse event.”
11 (Doc. No. 1163-4 at 128; *see also* Doc. No. 1215 at 15 n.41) (“[Safety] [s]ignals
12 generally indicate the need for further investigation, which may or may not lead to the
13 conclusion that the product caused the event. After a signal is identified, it should be
14 further assessed to determine whether it represents a potential safety risk and whether
15 other action should be taken.”).

16 To warrant inclusion in product labeling the FDA must conclude, at a minimum,
17 that there is some basis to believe there is a causal relationship between the drug and the
18 adverse reaction. The existence of a hypothetical causal association is insufficient to
19 satisfy this standard. *See Robinson*, 615 F.3d at 869 (noting a label describing every
20 serious disease that might or even arguably be caused by a drug would result in
21 “information overload” making “label warnings worthless to consumers”); *Mason*, 596
22 F.3d at 392 (“While it is important for a manufacturer to warn of potential side effects, it
23 is equally important that it not overwarn because overwarning can deter potentially
24 beneficial uses of the drug by making it seem riskier than warranted and can dilute the
25 effectiveness of valid warnings.”).¹⁹

26
27 ¹⁹ Plaintiffs also reference examples in the record where either the FDA or Defendants
28 have expressed concern about pancreatic cancer risk. (*See, e.g.*, Doc. Nos. 1165-16 at 5;

1 Additionally, the Court finds the FDA’s ongoing review of pancreatic safety more
2 indicative of the evolving nature of drug surveillance, than of the existence of a causal
3 association. Defendants’ expert stated, “as a matter of routine practice, FDA continuously
4 monitors every medication for new or evolving information as long as a drug is on the
5 market.” (Doc. No. 1163-4 at 115).²⁰ In *Levine*, the Supreme Court acknowledged the
6 same in noting that the CBE regulation “accounts for the fact that risk information
7 accumulates over time and that the same data may take on a different meaning in light of
8 subsequent developments.” *Levine*, 555 U.S. at 569. The potential for the FDA to reach a
9 different conclusion in the future in light of new scientific evidence or developments does
10 not preclude a finding of preemption now. Although the Assessment concluded the FDA
11 had not reached a final conclusion regarding pancreatic safety, whether the FDA will
12 definitively conclude the drugs do or do not cause or create an increased risk of
13 pancreatic cancer is unknown. Because the Court is required to analyze conflict
14 preemption in the context of the current record, the FDA’s ongoing review does not
15 undermine the FDA’s current conclusions.

16 ///

17
18 ///

19 _____
20 1219-5 at 9.) The Court finds these examples reinforce that both the FDA and Defendants
21 have been aware of and considered pancreatic cancer risk, and the Court does not assign
22 the same negative connotation to that acknowledgement as Plaintiffs.

23 ²⁰ Plaintiffs challenge the expert opinion offered by Dr. Lawrence Goldkind in support of
24 Defendants’ motion for summary judgment because his opinion is contrary to *Levine*.
25 (Doc. No. 1285 at 7) (citing *In re Trasyolol Products Liab. Litig.*, No. 08MD01928, 2010
26 WL 4259332, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 21, 2010)). Although a party may challenge the expert
27 testimony offered in connection with a motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs’
28 challenge is limited to Dr. Goldkind’s description of FDA labeling that is contrary to
Levine, and his opinion about the possibility that the FDA would reject a CBE. (Doc. No.
1285 at 7.) Because of the FDA’s extensive action specific to Plaintiffs’ claims, the Court
does not rely on Dr. Goldkind’s opinion regarding whether the FDA would reject a CBE,
and otherwise does not find his opinion is contrary to *Levine*.

1 *F. New safety information and the relevance of Buckman v. Plaintiffs’ Legal*
2 *Committee*

3 A central theory in Plaintiffs’ opposition to preemption is that new safety
4 information exists that could support a labeling change. Plaintiffs first raised this
5 argument in the context of preemption discovery through allegations that Defendants
6 withheld, misrepresented, or underrepresented data related to pancreatic cancer risk from
7 the FDA. Plaintiffs raise the same argument in the instant motions, asserting Defendants
8 failed to provide the FDA with data supportive of a causal connection between the drugs
9 and pancreatic cancer. According to Plaintiffs, because the FDA has not considered this
10 information, Defendants cannot establish conflict preemption.

11 With respect to Merck, Plaintiffs contend the FDA did not receive or consider a
12 ninety-eight page signal assessment completed by Health Canada regarding the
13 pancreatic safety of incretin mimetics. The signal assessment found the “use of Januvia
14 may be associated with an increased risk of cancer of the pancreas.” (Doc. No. 1164-3.)

15 Plaintiffs also contend Merck and Novo did not provide the FDA with evidence of
16 a pancreatic cancer imbalance in clinical trials. Plaintiffs cite to the FDA’s reliance on a
17 published study by a Merck employee, the results of which excluded three known cases
18 of pancreatic cancer in patients that had taken Januvia. (Doc. No. 1165-6.) Similarly,
19 Plaintiffs argue the annual review submitted to the FDA by Novo in August 2013
20 underrepresented clinical trial imbalances. (Doc. Nos. 1165-8; 1165-9.) Lastly, with
21 respect to Novo, Plaintiffs argue Novo did not provide the FDA with its secondary
22 internal analysis conducted on results from a 13-week study of ZDF rats. In the results
23 submitted to the FDA, Novo represented there were “no effects of liraglutide or exenatide
24 on overall pancreas weight or exocrine and duct cell mass proliferation,” and that “no
25 effect on the exocrine pancreas” was detected. (Doc. No. 1166-21.) A secondary analysis
26 of the data, however, suggested liraglutide “has some effect on [pancreatic ductal gland]
27 mass proliferation.” (Doc. Nos. 1165-1 at 23; 1165-13.)
28

1 Finally, Plaintiffs contend Amylin and Lilly did not provide the FDA with
2 evidence of precancerous lesions observed in primate studies. Based on the blinded
3 analysis conducted by one of Plaintiffs' experts, Plaintiffs contend that information
4 published and presented to the FDA omitted data demonstrating "overt pancreatic toxic
5 effects" including an increased occurrence of PanIN lesions. (Doc. No. 1165-11.)

6 Plaintiffs argue the above data constitutes new safety information within the
7 meaning of federal labeling regulations, thereby triggering Defendants obligation to
8 provide that information to the FDA. In response, Defendants argue there is no evidence
9 the data would be material to the FDA's conclusion regarding pancreatic safety, or that
10 the data would alter the FDA's position regarding the adequacy of product labeling. After
11 thorough consideration of Plaintiffs' arguments in the context of FDA regulations, and
12 the information at issue, the Court maintains its position as set forth in previous orders
13 regarding the relevance of this data to the Court's conflict preemption analysis.

14 In the context of preemption discovery, the Court ruled it could not entertain
15 allegations that Defendants misrepresented or underreported information to the FDA
16 regarding pancreatic cancer risk. (*See* Doc. No. 705.) Relying on the policy underlying
17 the Supreme Court decision of *Buckman v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee*, 531 U.S. 341
18 (2001), the Court declined to compel discovery and concluded that Plaintiffs'
19 misreporting and underreporting arguments were preempted. Plaintiffs contended then
20 and in the context of the current motions that *Buckman* is not applicable. Though
21 *Buckman* does not govern whether Plaintiffs' failure-to-warn claims are conflict
22 preempted, the Court finds *Buckman* implicated by Plaintiffs' defense to the clear
23 evidence standard.

24 In *Buckman*, the Supreme Court concluded that fraud-on-the-FDA claims were
25 preempted because they "inevitably conflict with the FDA's responsibility to police
26 fraud." *Id.* at 350. The Supreme Court therefore held that a plaintiff's state law claim
27 premised solely on allegations of misreporting or underreporting information to the FDA
28 is preempted. As support for its conclusion, *Buckman* noted such claims conflict with the

1 federal statutory scheme that empowers the FDA to deter fraud, and the increased and
2 inconsistent burdens such claims would assert on drug manufacturers. *Id.* (noting such
3 claims would “dramatically increase the burdens facing potential applicants—burdens not
4 contemplated by Congress” and “cause applicants to fear that their disclosures to the
5 FDA, although deemed appropriate by the Administration, will later be judged
6 insufficient in state court”).

7 Plaintiffs cite two cases in support of the argument that claims a defendant
8 withheld information from the FDA are not preempted under *Buckman* and operate to bar
9 a finding of conflict preemption. The cases, however, are readily distinguishable. The
10 first case, *In re Actos Products Liability Litigation*, presents far more egregious facts than
11 those implied by Plaintiffs in this matter. *Actos* involved the defendants’ ongoing
12 attempts to preclude the FDA from including a bladder cancer warning in product
13 labeling. *See* 2014 WL 4364832, at *20 (noting the defendants actively attempted “*to*
14 *prevent the FDA from including any warning* about bladder cancer on the Actos label”
15 and “*engaged in substantial negotiations with the FDA to prevent the inclusion on the*
16 *label of any warning about bladder cancer*”) (emphases in original). Plaintiffs in this
17 matter do not allege Defendants actively engaged in a campaign to deceive or mislead the
18 FDA, or to prevent the inclusion of a pancreatic cancer reference in product labeling.
19 Additionally, in *Actos*, the facts suggested the FDA concluded the labeling was
20 inadequate and sought the manufacturers help in creating an appropriate label. *Id.* The
21 FDA has made no such overtures in this case, instead concluding multiple times that
22 current product labeling adequately reflects scientific data.

23 Similarly, the court in *In re Fosamax Products Liability Litigation* did note in
24 finding preemption that the plaintiff did not argue the defendants had failed to provide all
25 of the information it had about the relevant injury to the FDA. 951 F. Supp. 2d at 705.
26 Such an assertion in this case, however, does not automatically preclude preemption. The
27 Court maintains its earlier position that such arguments are preempted to the extent they
28 are based on Defendants failure to comply with FDA reporting requirements. *See*

1 *Rheinfrank*, 2015 WL 4743056, at *11–12 (“Plaintiffs’ argument that Abbott withheld
2 certain information or misrepresented the results of studies in its 2005 and 2007
3 submissions to the FDA appears to be a fraud-on-the-FDA theory, which is preempted.”).
4 *Fosamax* does not convince the Court that such claims are properly considered in light of
5 *Buckman*, or that asserting Defendants misreported or underreported information to the
6 FDA militates against a finding of clear evidence. Thus, although Plaintiffs reframe this
7 data as new safety information, the Court declines to consider it as undermining the
8 FDA’s conclusion in the Assessment and citizen petition response.

9 As additional support for this conclusion, the Court notes that it remains unclear
10 whether the FDA considered this information, and if it did not, whether this data would
11 have altered the FDA’s conclusion. The parties’ experts dispute whether the information
12 was material to the FDA’s analysis and offer little clarity on this point. However, as
13 noted at the hearing on these motions, it is unlikely that a conflict preemption proponent,
14 or a plaintiff opposing the defense, would ever know the full extent of what the FDA
15 reviewed in evaluating a safety signal. Under Plaintiffs’ reasoning, a plaintiff could
16 always cite to a particular piece of data, presumably unconsidered by the FDA, and
17 overcome conflict preemption. A reevaluation of scientific data or a judicial challenge to
18 the accuracy of the FDA’s conclusions would disrupt the “delicate balance of statutory
19 objectives” the *Buckman* Court sought to preserve. *Buckman Co.*, 531 U.S. at 351 (noting
20 fraud-on-the-FDA claims “would exert an extraneous pull on the scheme established by
21 Congress, and it is therefore pre-empted by that scheme”).

22 Lastly, Plaintiffs cite to *Levine* and *Gaeta* and argue throughout their briefing that
23 there is no evidence the FDA considered this allegedly withheld or misrepresented data.
24 *Levine*, however, does not mandate which data the FDA must consider in evaluating a
25 safety signal or labeling change. The relevant consideration is whether the FDA
26 considered the *safety concern* challenged by a plaintiff—IV push versus IV drip
27 administration of Phenergan in *Levine*, and concomitant use of ibuprofen and other drugs
28 known to cause liver toxicity in *Gaeta*. Courts have not addressed the specific data relied

1 on by the FDA in reaching its conclusion. What the FDA considers in evaluating a safety
2 signal is best left to the discretion of the FDA and not subject to challenge as part of a
3 preemption analysis. Thus, Plaintiffs’ challenges to the completeness of the FDA’s
4 conclusions, the data it considered, and the weight it afforded such data are not
5 persuasive or appropriate considerations in analyzing the clear evidence standard.

6 In this respect, the Court must also afford deference to the FDA’s repeated
7 conclusion that analyses of adverse event data and spontaneous reporting is not
8 illustrative of a causal relationship. Throughout its review of pancreatic cancer risk, the
9 FDA has consistently rejected adverse event data as illustrative of a causal association.
10 (*See, e.g.*, Doc. Nos. 1163-4 at 79, 90; 1163-3 at 3); *see also Dobbs*, 797 F. Supp. 2d at
11 1273 (noting in its preemption analysis that the FDA did not consider individual
12 manufacturer’s reports of adverse events sufficiently persuasive to provide “reasonable
13 evidence of an association” between the drug and the reported adverse consequence). At
14 oral argument, Plaintiffs challenged this conclusion as well, by citing to studies indicating
15 a greater significance of adverse event data in connection with a proliferation theory of
16 pancreatic cancer risk. (Doc. No. 1445 at 113–114, 118, 122–123.)²¹ This argument is
17 unpersuasive for the same reason noted above. Although Plaintiffs indicated such a
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19
20 ²¹ The cell proliferation theory is Plaintiffs’ dominant theme. Indeed, this theory was
21 specifically considered by the FDA in Assessment. (*See* Doc. No. 1163-3 at 3 (“These
22 studies included extensive histopathological evaluation of the endocrine and exocrine
23 pancreas, including analysis of ductal morphology and histochemical staining capable of
24 disclosing pathological proliferation and apoptosis.”); *see also* Doc. No. 1163-4 at 89
25 (noting no adverse effect on exocrine histology or proliferation).) A secondary theme of
26 Plaintiffs is the lack of tests before the FDA on animal specimens more typical of
27 diabetic patients, *e.g.*, overweight or obese specimens. Again, the Assessment belies this
28 assertion by specifically commenting on FDA-mandated pancreatic toxicity studies
performed in a rodent model of diabetes. (*See* Doc. No. 1163-3 at 3.) Finally, Plaintiffs
argue the inclusion of pancreatitis in product labeling is evidence the FDA would permit
Defendants to reference pancreatic cancer. It does not follow, however, that a reference to
pancreatitis supports reference to a pancreatic cancer, particularly in light of the FDA’s
repeated conclusions to the contrary.

1 theory suggested stronger evidence of a causal association, they also admitted that the
2 FDA considered that theory, but gave it “no weight” in their overall analysis. (Doc. No.
3 1445 at 124:24–25.) Plaintiffs in essence request the Court to substitute Plaintiffs’
4 evaluation of scientific data for that of the FDA’s. If the FDA was not as active in
5 investigating pancreatic cancer risk, and as consistent in its conclusion that a causal
6 association is indeterminate, the Court could find Plaintiffs’ arguments weighed against
7 preemption. However, the FDA’s extensive evaluation of pancreatic cancer risk
8 forecloses such consideration or reevaluation of what the FDA considered or how it
9 reached its conclusions.

10 In light of the foregoing, the existence of new safety information does not alter the
11 Court’s conclusion that clear evidence exists that the FDA would have rejected a
12 pancreatic cancer label change at the time Plaintiffs’ claims accrued.

13 V. CONCLUSION

14 As set forth above, Defendants have demonstrated by clear evidence that the FDA
15 would have rejected a reference to pancreatic cancer in the product labeling during the
16 time in which Plaintiffs’ claims accrued. Plaintiffs’ challenges to the FDA’s conclusions
17 regarding pancreatic cancer risk are insufficient to overcome preemption in light of the
18 extensive regulatory history of the drugs at issue. The evidence establishes the FDA has
19 reviewed the risk specific to Plaintiffs’ claims and, after considering the totality of
20 available scientific data, concluded a warning or other reference to that risk is
21 unsubstantiated. Accordingly, the Court **GRANTS** Defendants’ motion for summary
22 judgment and **DENIES** Plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment.

23 The scope of the Court’s order on preemption applies to Plaintiffs’ claims that
24 accrued any time before the date the record closed on the instant motions for summary
25 judgment.²² Other courts to address conflict preemption in the pharmaceutical drug
26

27 ²² Although the Court heard oral argument on September 11, 2015, the Court permitted
28 the filing of additional briefing from the state court proceedings, which the parties filed in

1 context have found FDA action immediately before, during, and after the time a
2 plaintiff's claim accrued relevant to a preemption analysis.²³ Finding no significant
3 temporal gaps between the FDA's conclusions regarding pancreatic cancer risk and the
4 dates Plaintiffs' claims accrued, the Court finds such claims preempted. Though the most
5 compelling example of clear evidence the FDA would have rejected a pancreatic cancer
6 label change occurred in 2014, the record supports the conclusion that a label change
7 would have been rejected at any earlier date, when presumably less scientific data
8 existed, and less extensive research by the FDA had been conducted. This is particularly
9 true as the FDA's earliest conclusions regarding pancreatic cancer risk as presented in the
10 record occurred in 2009. Thus, the affirmative defense of preemption operates to bar
11 Plaintiffs' claims which accrued prior to the close of the record.

12
13 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

14 Dated: November 9, 2015


15 _____
16 Hon. Anthony J. Battaglia
17 United States District Judge
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22 this matter on October 15, 2015. Thus, the Court considers October 15, 2015, the date the
23 record closed for the purposes of its preemption finding.

24 ²³ See *Rheinfrank*, WL 4743056, at *10 (“The Court finds the FDA’s February 2006
25 decision that developmental delay warnings ‘should not be incorporated into [Depakote]
26 labeling’ and the FDA’s 2008 belief that ‘the data do not provide sufficient evidence to
27 support [Depakote] labeling changes at this time’ constitute ‘clear evidence’ that when
28 confronted by the issue in 2003, the FDA would have rejected an attempt to add a
developmental delay warning.”); *Dobbs*, 797 F. Supp. 2d at 1275 (considering the FDA’s
actions from 1993 through 2007 in evaluating whether a warning would have been
approved in 2002).